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Non-technical summary
Concluding remarks
state governments play NashAbstract
This paper studies the provision of public inputs in a federal sys-
tem. A vertical tax externality is also considered in a simple general
equilibrium model used to analyze the eﬃciency of equilibria under
diﬀerent scenarios. The results show that the state provision of public
inputs may aﬀect ambiguously federal tax revenues, depending on the
vertical tax externality, amongst others issues. Moreover, it is proved
that achieving a second best allocation is not straightforward for a fed-
eral government that plays as Stackelberg leader. At this point, the
state’s reaction function becomes crucial when the design of vertical
grants is restricted.
Keywords: Fiscal federalism, vertical externality, productive pub-
lic spending.
JEL Classiﬁcation:H 2 ,H 4 ,H 7
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The existence of vertical externalities is a standard feature in federal countries. 
Literature has paid a special attention on vertical tax externalities, which arise 
when two or more different levels of government share the same tax base. The 
mechanism through which they act consists of ignoring the effect of tax rates 
decisions taken by one government on other levels of governments’ revenues. In 
particular, the social marginal cost of the public funds is underestimated, and it 
consequently leads to overprovision of public goods. 
 
In the case of vertical expenditure externalities things are similar. Indeed, the 
level of education or public infrastructures provided by one level of government 
affects other governments’ budget constraint. Examples of that can be found not 
only in federal countries but also at supranational level such as European Union; 
as is well-known, EU regional policy is based on the provision of productivity-
enhancing public inputs, which have positive consequences on national and 
regional tax revenues.  
 
This paper uses Boadway and Keen’s (1996) model for studying both types of 
vertical externalities and their implications on efficiency. We assume that 
federal government provides a consumption public good whereas state 
governments finance public inputs affecting positively labor productivity. Both 
levels of government use taxes on labor and economic rents as resources. 
Moreover, we deal with restrictions considering the availability of policy 
instruments: federal government cannot make use of grants to correct vertical 
externalities. In this regard, the paper tries to reproduce a common feature in 
many federal countries, namely constitutional arrangements may prevent the 
design of intergovernmental transfers based on efficiency criteria exclusively. 
Using as benchmark the optimum solution achieved in a unitary country, we 
discuss the optimality of equilibria when Nash behavior is assumed for both 
governments, and when the federal government plays as Stackelberg leader with 
the aim of replicating the second best outcome.  
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(2003); they state that vertical tax and expenditure externalities are independent 
each one from the other. In this regard, we prove that the reasoning followed by 
Dahlby and Wilson –based on the production efficiency condition- may lead to 
misleading conclusions when is used in federal frameworks. 
 
Thirdly, considering the ability of federal government to achieve the second best 
solution of the unitary country, we conclude that this result is not 
straightforward as there exist restrictions for the use of vertical grants, even with 
the federal government behaving as Stackelberg leader. This paper demonstrates 
that when the set of policy instruments is restricted, the effectiveness of the 
federal tax rate to implement the second best optimum depends on the state 
governments' reaction to changes in federal taxes, and this is an empirical issue. 
Also we obtain that the optimum federal tax rate can be positive, unlike 
Boadway and Keen's (1996) findings.  
 
 
The main findings of the paper are the following. Firstly, in line with other 
results of literature, we obtained that the sign of the vertical expenditure 
externality is unclear in the sense that public input may affect ambiguously tax 
revenues collected by both levels of governments. Secondly, we show that the 
sign and magnitude of the vertical expenditure externality depends on marginal 
productivity of public input, sensitivity of wage rate to public input, share of 
rents levied by federal government, and elasticity of labor supply to the federal 
tax rate. In such a way, the model sharply contrasts to that of Dahlby and Wilson 
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Traditionally, the study of vertical externalities in a federation has been fo-
cused on tax externalities, in which diﬀerent levels of government share the
same tax base. As is well-known, it leads to an overprovision of public goods
as long as the deadweight loss of distorting taxation is underestimated by
governments. Flowers (1988) deals with this issue through a Leviathan’s ap-
proach and shows how the federation may end up at the downward-sloping
part of the Laﬀer curve. Papers such as Dahlby and Wilson (1994), Boadway
and Keen (1996), and Sato (2000) ﬁnd similar conclusions when a benevo-
lent government is involved1. Moreover, these contributions propose diﬀerent
systems of vertical transfers that correct these externalities between govern-
ments.
Vertical externalities may also arise when other aspects are regarded.
Boadway at al. (1998) use a model with heterogeneous and partially-mobile
agents to make explicit the trend of the states to be too progressive. In terms
of interregional trade, Lucas (2004) has shown recently how a federal govern-
ment as Stackelberg leader can replicate the unitary nation optimum through
matching grants in a federation with vertical and horizontal externalities.
An issue upon which the main branch of the literature has not paid much
attention is the vertical externality coming from the provision of public in-
puts. This point refers to the positive or negative eﬀects that the productive
public spending by one level of government may exert on other levels’ rev-
enues. In addition, this fact can be found in supranational structures such
as European Union, in which an important share of its budget is devoted
to regional policies based on the provision of infrastructures; there are no
doubts that these types of policies have a positive impact on local, regional
and federal budget constraints in many Member States.
Anyway, some papers have dealt with this concern. Dalhby (1996) de-
scribes the eﬀects of expenditure externalities in a federation, and deﬁnes a
general framework for matching grants in order to eliminate them. Wrede
(2000) deals with productivity increasing public services in a federation con-
sisting of Leviathan governments. Recently, Dalhby and Wilson (2003) ex-
amine a model in which state governments provide a productivity-enhancing
1Nevertheless, Keen (1998) claims that the eﬀects of federal taxes on state taxes are
not so much straightforward as it might seem: under certain conditions, increases in the
federal tax rate may reduce the state tax rates. Empirical evidence is miscellaneous (see,
for instance, Esteller-More and Sole-Olle, 2001, and Anderson et al., 2004).
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pact on federal revenues, and a matching grant from the federal government
t ot h es t a t e si sa b l et oc o r r e c ti t .
This paper uses Boadway and Keen’s (1996) model to study the eﬃciency
of equilibria when a public input is provided by state governments. We here
consider the positive impact of a public input on wage rate through a higher
labor productivity. Federal and state governments use per unit taxes on
labor instead of ad valorem taxes used by Dahlby and Wilson; it allows us to
focus on the (likely) positive externality derived from the public input, rather
than other positive vertical externalities that may arise when ad valorem
taxes are involved. The behavior of governments has been modeled under
diﬀerent scenarios: as a central government in an unitary country, diﬀerent
governments as Nash competitors, and one level of government (the federal
one) acting as Stackelberg leader. Moreover, we wonder about the capability
of the federal government to achieve a second-best solution. At this point, we
deal with restrictions by employing policy instruments: federal government
cannot make use of vertical grants to correct vertical externalities. This way,
the paper tries to reproduce a common feature in real federations, namely,
constitutional arrangements may prevent the design of intergovernmental
transfers based on eﬃciency criteria exclusively2.
The results show that, as Dahlby and Wilson (2003) point out, the
marginal cost of providing a public input may be under or overestimated
in a federal system. However, contrary to Dahlby and Wilson (2003), our
paper ﬁnds a bias between the unitary and the federal solution, which is
not independent of the vertical tax externality. The reasoning followed in
this paper sharply contrasts to that of Dahlby and Wilson (2003) because
we detect that production eﬃciency condition does not perform properly as
criterion for assessing optimality in federal countries, as they do. Moreover,
since no vertical transfers are available in our model, it is not straightforward
the ability of federal government behaving as Stackelberg leader to replicate
the second best outcome. This paper demonstrates that when the set of
policy instruments is restricted, the eﬀectiveness of the federal tax rate to
implement the second best optimum depends on the state governments’ re-
action to changes in federal taxes. Also we obtain that the optimum federal
2In addition, this point also allows to relate our model to literature on optimal taxation
and the availability of policy tools (see Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1971) and subsequent
papers)
tax rate can be positive, unlike Boadway and Keen’s (1996) ﬁndings.
8
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 484
May 2005The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the main
features of the model. Section 3 provides the second best outcome achieved
in an unitary country. Next section compares this result to those reached
when federal and state governments play Nash. Section 5 studies whether
federal government behaving as Stackelberg leader is able to replicate the
second best allocation. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2T h e m o d e l
We assume a country with a federal government and k identical states. It
will allow us to address symmetric allocations and to eliminate the possibility
of horizontal grants used for redistribution aims. Due to this symmetry, we
will focus our discussion on the bilateral relationship between the federal
government and only one state government.
Each state is populated by n identical households that are assumed to be
completely immobile3. Household’s utility function is given by the separable
form:
u(x,l)+B (G), (1)
where x is a private good used as numeraire, l is the labor supplied, and G
is a pure public good provided by the federal government. The properties
of the function u(x,l) are the standard ones, and B (G) is increasing and
concave. The representative household faces the following budget constraint:
x =( ω − τ)l, (2)
where ω i st h ew a g er a t ea n dτ the per unit tax on labor. Household’s
optimization problem consists of maximizing (1) subject to (2), and that
yields labor supply l(ω − τ) and indirect utility function V (ω − τ)+B (G).
3Relaxing the assumption of complete household immobility would have no eﬀects on
the eﬃciency of the equilibria and governments’ behavior, as long as states are assumed
to be symmetric (Proposition 4 in Boadway and Keen, 1996). By contrast, when there is
(perfect o imperfect) inter-regional population movements and states are not homogeneous,
the second best allocation does not require the equalization of the conventional form of
the marginal cost of the public funds across regions and layers of government (Sato, 2000).
It is assumed that l
0 > 04.
4Hereafter, diﬀerentiation is denoted by a prime for functions of a single variable, while
a subscript is used for partial derivatives.
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input g according to the following aggregate state production function:
F (L,g), (3)
where L = nl.T h i s f u n c t i o n s a t i s ﬁes the usual assumptions: increasing in
its arguments and strictly concave. Output can be used costlessly as x,G or
g. Labor market is perfectly competitive so that we can write:
ω = FL [nl(ω − τ),g] (4)
It allows us to achieve the wage function ω(g,τ,n). Some results of compar-









0 > 0 (6)
Economic proﬁti sd e ﬁned as a residual, or
π(g,τ,n)=F [nl(ω(g,τ,n) − τ),g] − nl[ω(g,τ,n) − τ]ω(g,τ,n) (7)
Again, it is useful to obtain some results for later use:






nl ≶ 0 (8)




Note that the eﬀect of public inputs on rents is ambiguous because g increases
output (and hence, the economic proﬁts) but also exerts a positive impact
upon wage rate, reducing rents.
Each level of government sets its own tax rate on labor. Denoting T as
the tax rate established by federal government and t as the corresponding
variable at state level, it can be written τ = T +t. Thus, the revenue raised
by federal government to ﬁnance G is:
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where 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 is the proportional tax rate on proﬁts levied by federal
government, and S is a vertical transfer between both levels of government5.
Throughout this paper, θ is assumed to be ﬁxed and exogenously determined.
The eﬀects of changes in T, t, g and S on federal budget constraint are given
by:
GT =( ωτ − 1)knTl
0
+ knl + kθπτ (11)
Gt =( ωτ − 1)knTl
0
+ kθπτ = GT − knl (12)
Gg = knTl
0
ωg + kθπg (13)
GS = −k (14)
The state revenue constraint is
g(t,T,θ,n,S)=ntl(ω(g,τ,n) − τ)+( 1− θ)π(g,τ,n)+S (15)
State government appears as the only agent providing the public input. Note
that all economic proﬁts are taxed away by both levels of governments be-
cause rents are eﬃcient resources for public sector6. For future reference, the
impacts of changes in t, T and S are obtained:
gt =( ωτ − 1)ntl
0
+ nl +( 1− θ)πτ (16)
gT =( ωτ − 1)ntl
0
+( 1− θ)πτ = gt − nl (17)
gS =1 (18)
5S may have either sign and it is deﬁned as a lump-sum grant in the sense of Boadway
and Keen (1996) or Sato (2000).
6We establish here that the country is under-populated in order to avoid that tax on
rents may suﬃce to ﬁnance the ﬁrst-best level of public good (Wildasin, 1986).
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externality arises. Equations (12)-(13) show how federal government’s tax
revenues are aﬀected by ﬁscal decisions taken by state government on the tax
rate and on the provision of the public input, respectively, while equation (17)
is the eﬀect of the federal tax upon state government’s revenues.
3 T h es e c o n d - b e s ta l l o c a t i o ni na nu n i t a r y
country
Characterizing a vertical externality requires to consider the diﬀerences be-
tween the optimal solution in an unitary country, and the solution achieved
when several levels of government exist. In this section, we obtain the ﬁrst
order conditions for the optimal provision of the national public good G and
the public input g in an unitary country.
The central government chooses the values of G,g and τ to maximize
the representative household’s utility subject to an aggregated budget con-
straint7. Formally,
Max V (ω − τ)+B (G)
s.t. : G + kg = knτl(ω(g,τ,n) − τ)+kπ(g,τ,n),( 1 9 )
First order conditions for G,g and τ are, respectively, as follows:
B
0
(G) − µ =0 (20)
V
0
ωg − µk + µknτl
0
ωg + µkπg =0 (21)
(ωτ − 1)V
0
+ µknl + µ(ωτ − 1)knτl
0
+ µkπτ =0 , (22)
where µ is the Lagrange’s multiplier. Combining (20) with (22), using Roy’s
identity and the expressions (6) and (9), yield the necessary condition for the
second best provision of national public good G8:
7Wildasin (1986) demonstrates that it is relevant to distinguish between to maximize
the per capita utility or the total utility. As cited by Mansoorian and Myers (1995),
considering the total utility of households as objective function implies that each state
authority has a preference for the population size. With symmetric equilibria and no
migration as here, this point is not very relevant, but it would prevent the extension of the
results obtained to an environment in which households mobility is allowed. See footnote
3.
8Identifying the optima achieved as second best solutions is related uniquely to the
presence of distorting labor taxation.
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where λ is the private marginal utility of income. LHS of equation (23) is the
sum of marginal beneﬁts received by all households living in the federation.
RHS of equation (23) is the marginal cost of providing G.A si sw e l l - k n o w n ,
this expression is the Samuelson’s rule for public good provision corrected by
Atkinson and Stern (1974).
After some manipulation with equations (21) and (22), using again Roy’s
identity, and the expressions (6) and (9), the second best condition for the















In essence, the interpretation of this equation is the same than before for
G. However, it may be worth noting that two terms can be distinguished in
the RHS. The ﬁrst one is the marginal cost of the public funds (MCPF);
the second one is the tax revenue eﬀect that arises so long as g may aﬀect
positively or negatively tax bases through labor productivity and economic
proﬁts. Both terms of the RHS deﬁne the marginal cost of providing the
public input (MCP). Whereas in the case of the consumption public good
the MCPF and the MCP are identical, when the public input is considered
this distinction is required.
In other words, while the MCPF is a concept that exclusively refers to
the use of distorting taxation (regardless providing public goods or inputs),
the MCP takes into consideration not only the MCPF but also the comple-
mentarity between public spending and government’s revenues through what
we have named tax revenue eﬀect.
Comparing expressions (23) and (24) a simple result that will be used
later is obtained:
Proposition 1 If central government in an unitary country sets a tax rate
τ>0 and πg 1 0, then the marginal cost of providing G will be higher than
that corresponding for g (Suﬃcient condition).
Note that if the provision of g has a positive impact on tax bases, then
the marginal cost of providing the public input is below the MCPF,e v e n
13
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and expressions (5) and (8) are inserted in (24), manipulation gives:
Fg =1 ,( 2 5 )
that is, the production eﬃciency condition for the provision of public inputs
(Diamond and Mirrlees, 1971). It means that the production eﬀects of the
public input are equal to its marginal production cost, though distortionary
(but optimally set) taxation to be used9.
4 Vertical externalities when federal and state
governments play Nash
The existence of diﬀerent levels of government may alter the behavior of the
agents if they share the same tax base and/or public spending coming from
the state governments is able to modify the federal budget constraint.
This section deals with the optimal conditions involved when state and
federal governments behave as Nash competitors, that is, each government
t a k e sa sg i v e nt h et a xr a t e sa n dt h el e v e lo fp u b l i ce x p e n d i t u r ei m p l e m e n t e d
by other governments. Hence, state’s optimization problem consists of se-
lecting the values for g and t in order to maximize the per capita utility of
the state, taken its own budget constraint into account. Formally,
Max V (ω(g,τ,n) − τ)+B (G)
s.t. : g = ntl(ω(g,τ,n) − τ)+( 1− θ)π(g,τ,n)+S (26)
First order conditions we obtain are:
V
0
ωg − µ + µntl
0
ωg + µ(1 − θ)πg =0 (27)
(ωτ − 1)V
0
+ µnl + µ(ωτ − 1)ntl
0
+ µ(1 − θ)πτ =0 , (28)
The expression that relates marginal beneﬁts and costs of providing the pub-













ωg − (1 − θ)πg
´
(29)
9For further discussion, see Feehan and Matsumoto (2002).
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provision when distorting taxes are used and diﬀerent eﬀects on state tax
revenues are involved. A key question arises here about the optimality of
this result when comparing to the second best outcome. Our model yields
the following proposition:
Proposition 2 If T ≥ 0, the MCPF perceived by state governments that
play Nash is smaller than the MCPF in an unitary country. However, the
marginal cost of providing g perceived by state governments may be higher,
equal or smaller than in an unitary country.
Proof. Using τ = T + t, an alternative expression of the RHS of equation
















First term is the MCPF. By assumption, FLL < 0 so that denominator is
bigger than that of expression (24); thus, the MCPF is smaller with state
governments. Regarding the marginal cost of provision, nothing can be said
about the magnitude of its second term in relation to (24). Note that by (8),
πg may have either sign.
The ﬁrst part of the proposition is a standard result in the literature,
regardless a consumption public good or a public input to be considered.
When a vertical tax externality exists, the MCPF for providing both kinds
of public expenditures are perceived as lower by state governments. The
second part of the proposition pays attention upon the MCP,a n dc l a i m s
that the sign of expenditure vertical externality is not determined, so that
the state government may under or over-provide the public input.
In this regard, it can be stated that having a positive or negative vertical
externality depends ﬁrstly on the relative changes in the magnitude of the
MCPF a n di nt h et a xr e v e n u ee ﬀect when a federal structure is introduced,
and secondly on the sign of the eﬀect of public inputs on rents. In particular,
if πg 1 0 the sign of both combined vertical externalities will depend on the
relative magnitudes of both terms in (30) because they change in opposite
senses. By contrast, if πg < 0 it may occur that both terms in (30) move
in the same sense, and consequently an overprovision of public inputs takes
place, but in principle the indetermination is still present.
15
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S be the ratio between the MCP in an
unitary country and the MCP perceived by state governments, both of them
referring g (the RHS of equations (24) and (29), respectively). Proposition
2 states that ψ ≷ 1, i. e., when the state government provides a sub-optimal
level of public input, then ψ<1,a n do t h e r w i s e .
Proposition 3 Ceteris paribus,
i) ψ is decreasing in the elasticity of wage rate to g if T>0
ii) ψ is decreasing in the marginal productivity of g if 0 <θ<1.
iii) ψ is increasing in the share of rents levied by the federal government
θ when πg 0 0
iv) ψ is increasing in the elasticity of the labor supply to the federal tax
rate T (in absolute value).
Proof. i) Using the terms with ωg in the second term of (30) -and not
present in (24)- and the expression (8) for πg, yield nTl
0ωg + θnlFLLl
0ωg.
Rearranging we can write that (T − θlFLL)nl
0ωg > 0,g i v e n( 5 ) ,T>0 (by
assumption) and FLL < 0.
ii) Using expression (8) and 0 <θ<1,a ni n c r e a s ei nFg reduces the
second term of (30). But this eﬀect is bigger in the case of numerator of
(24), hence ψ decreases.


















¶2 .S i n c eb o t ht e r m so ft h eR H So f
(29) are positive, then FLL < 0 and πg 0 0 lead to a negative sign in the
latter derivative. Thus, MCP
g
S is decreasing in θ,a n dψ is increasing in θ.
iv) In the denominator of the MCPF in expression (30), term Tl
0
l is the
elasticity of labor supply to the federal tax rate T (in absolute value).
In short, the higher the elasticity of wage rate to public inputs and the
higher the marginal productivity of public inputs, the more likely is to ﬁnd
infraprovision of public inputs. By contrast, the higher the federal tax rate
on rents and the higher the elasticity of labor supply to the federal tax rate,
the more likely is to reach overprovision of public inputs.
Parts i) and ii) of proposition 3 show that the sign of vertical expenditure
externality depends crucially on the tax revenue eﬀect produced by public
input provision. In fact, the more productive the public input, the more tax
16
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sees and what actually happens will be bigger, and it obsviously will lead to
infraprovision of public inputs.
Part iii) follows an inverse argument. When public input aﬀects nega-
tively rents, increasing the federal share on economic proﬁts taxes is damaged
for federal government, so that risk of overprovision of g rises.
Part iv) of proposition 3 qualiﬁes the statement by Dahlby and Wilson
(2003) that vertical tax externalities do not aﬀect public spending external-
ities. We have found that the extent in which the MCP
g
S diﬀers from the
MCP
g
U (i. e., the sign and magnitude of the externality) depends on the tax
rate set by federal government or whether labor supply is more o less sensitive
to the federal tax rate. It means that both externalities are interrelated10.
In contrast with that, reasoning followed by Dalhby and Wilson (2003) is
based on production eﬃciency condition and concludes that both external-
ities are independent each other. Nevertheless, recent papers by Blackorby
and Brett (2000) and Kotsogiannis and Makris (2002) have proved that con-
sidering production eﬃciency as criterion for assessing optimality in federal
system may be inappropriate. Our model oﬀers a clear insight about that.







i. e., production eﬃciency does not hold when governments play Nash. If
all the taxes on proﬁts were levied by state government (θ =0 ), the above
expression would become Fg =1 ,t h a ti s ,t h ee ﬃciency in production of public
inputs would be achieved but condition for optimality is not still satisﬁed (see
equation (29) with θ =0 )11.
10In some sense, our vertical expenditure externality holds certain similarities with hori-
zontal externalities. Indeed, assuming a positive impact of state public input on federal tax
revenues, it appears a trend towards the infraprovision of g that can be seen as state tax
rates being too low (as a result of ﬁscal competition in the case of horizontal externalities).
In such a way, Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002) and Madies (2004) have recently shown the
interdependence between both externalities, in line with the results of this paper.
11Translating this argument to Dahlby and Wilson’s (2003) model, we reach the same
conclusion. Using their expressions (6) and (16), an optimal federal tax rate T∗ removing
both vertical externalities can be achieved (we do something similar in the next section);
however, inserting that T ∗ into their expression (19), production eﬃciency is not fulﬁlled.
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leader
Considering that the federal government behaves as Stackelberg leader, antic-
ipating the eﬀects of its actions on the states’ decisions, has been the usual
way to correct vertical externalities. Federal government sets its tax rate
taken as given the states’ reaction function, and is able to replicate the sec-
o n db e s to u t c o m ea c h i e v e db yg o v e r n m e n ti na nu n i t a r yc o u n t r y .H o w e v e r ,
the success of this policy is very sensitive to whether federal government has
unrestricted access to vertical transfers or not. As Keen (1998) points out,
if vertical transfers are not available for federal government, to achieve the
second best allocation is not straightforward, even when the states’ reaction
function is known.
Our aim here is to shed some light about the capacity of federal gov-
ernment to get the second best outcome when a public input is provided.
Vertical transfers will not be allowed for the federal government, whose only
instrument to aﬀect the behavior of the states will be the tax rate T.T h i s
approach seeks to show not only how the conclusions of the main branch of
literature may be modiﬁed when policy instruments are restricted, but also
to know under which assumptions a federal system with no vertical transfers
is able to achieve the second best allocation. This environment also per-
mits dealing with features of real federations, namely, the intergovernmental
grants are not usually designed to correct vertical externalities, or sometimes
constitutional arrangements prevent the use of vertical transfers based on
eﬃciency criteria exclusively.
As a preliminary point, we should question if there exists a federal tax
rate that corrects both vertical externalities. Following Boadway and Keen
(1996), we deﬁne the marginal vertical externality as follows:
γ = Gt + Gg,( 3 2 )
that is, considering the negative and/or positive eﬀects on federal revenues
generated by states by means of their own taxes and the provision of public
inputs. As at an optimum γ =0 , inserting (12) and (13) in (32), and solving
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tax rate T is the unique instrument to oﬀset the two opposite eﬀects that
states’ decisions have on the federal revenues. The ﬁrst eﬀect comes from the
fact that state tax rates exert a negative impact on federal budget constraint;
as pointed out by Boadway and Keen (1996), in that case federal government
should subsidy the (common) tax base that, as a result of the tax externality,
is over-exploited. But secondly, it is also likely that the provision of public
inputs increases federal revenues (positive expenditure externality); thus if
t follows T, it may be convenient that a positive federal tax rate to be im-
plemented in order to encourage state taxes. This way, resources for public
input provision will rise. Note that in accordance with Proposition 3 (iv),
the MCP
g
S is decreasing in Tl
0
l (ψ is increasing in Tl
0
l ), so T may stimulate
the spending in g.
Another key question is to know what is the state’s reaction function
with respect to the federal tax rate. So far, each level of government acted
independently; under the new framework, federal government knows the ef-
fects of its policy on state’s behavior, that is, it knows the state’s reaction




ωggt +( ωτ − 1)V
0
=0 ,( 3 4 )
diﬀerentiating this expression with respect to T we obtain:














ωττ (1 + tT)=0
As gtT = gtt +( ωτ − 1)l
0n, rearranging terms and solving for tT,t h ea b o v e













i. e., the state’s reaction function. Given the assumptions of our model,
nothing can be said about the sign of tT (tT ≶ 0). In other words, state tax
rates may react ambiguously to changes in the federal tax rate.
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changes in federal taxes on the national tax rate of the federation remain:
the sign of 1+ tT continues being indeterminate12.T h i s a m b i g u i t y c o m e s
from the unclear net eﬀect of the two vertical externalities when they are
considered jointly. While in the case of Boadway and Keen (1996) there exists
a remarkable tendency towards overprovision (and the subsequent increase
in all tax rates), infraprovision of public inputs (or what is the same, state
tax rate being too low) can be found when expenditures externalities are
regarded. Even it may lead to reduce the national tax rate τ when federal
government sets higher tax rates.
In order to consider how is the response of the state tax rate to changes






ωggtttS +( ωτ − 1)
2 V
00
tS =0 , (36)
that leads to tS =0 , that is, the tax rate is unaﬀected by the transfer13.
Contrary to Boadway and Keen (1996), where this situation is caused by
a linear utility function in G, our model does not recognize any ability of
the vertical transfer for inﬂuencing t, regardless the properties of the utility
function. It means that income eﬀects go entirely to the provision of the
state public input. Moreover, this is consistent with the null role played by
vertical transfers as policy instruments in our model.
At this point, the federal’s optimization problem we have to solve is the
following:
Max V (ω(g(t,T,θ,S),τ,n) − τ)+B (G(T,t,θ,S,g(t,T,θ,S)))
s.t. : t = t(T,θ,S) (37)
As can be seen, both objective function and federal constraint take into
consideration the behavior of the states and the inﬂuence of federal decisions
on them. In such a way, federal government chooses T regarding the ﬁrst
order conditions obtained for state government. Formally:




[GT + GttT + GggT]=0 (38)
12Note that 1+tT = dτ
dT .
13This result is based on the assumptions of the model after some manipulation in (36).
Details are available upon request.
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,( 3 9 )
where (11) and (16) have been used. Expression (39) relates the MCP
of G at federal level (MCPG
F )t ot h eMCP of g at state level (MCP
g
S)
when the former government behaves as Stackelberg leader and the latter
one as follower. Note that if tax bases are not shared and the provision of
public inputs corresponds to the central government exclusively, i. e., t =













,( 4 0 )
that is, the relation between the MCP of G and the MCP of g at second
best optimum in an unitary country.
Given these two alternative relationships between the MCP under dif-
ferent scenarios, a discussion can be initiated about if federal government





S be the variable
that relates both MCP assuming Stackelberg approach. The relevant issue
here is to know what extent this variable is with respect to 1; this way, we
will know whether the federal structure of the country leads to an under or
overprovision of the public input, using the unitary solution as benchmark.
Proposition 4 If federal government plays as Stackelberg leader (with T∗ >
0)a n dπg 1 0,t h e nη ≶ 1.H e n c e ,MCPG




Proof. Using (16) and rearranging terms, the expression in parenthesis in




knl [Gg +( 1+tT)Gt]
(41)
By (6) and (9), gT < 0;i fπg 1 0,t h e nGg > 0 when T∗ > 0,a n dGt < 0 by
(9), ∀T∗ > 0.A s 1+ tT ≶ 0, we are not sure if the denominator of (41) is
higher, equal or smaller than 1. So η ≶ 1.
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the second best optimum with no vertical grants. Notice that in an unitary
country, also with τ>0 and πg 1 0,t h eMCP of G is higher than the
MCP of g unambiguously (Proposition 1). From Proposition 4 a necessary
condition to ensure the second best optimum must be established:
Corollary to Proposition 4 Federal government that plays as Stackel-
berg may achieve the second best outcome if, and only if, 1+ tT > 1,o rw h a t
is the same, tT > 0.
Proof. As the necessary condition for achieving an optimal result is that
(41) to be bigger than 1, and since gT < 0, Gg > 0,a n dGt < 0,w en e e dt o
have Gg +( 1+tT)Gt > 0. Inserting here the expressions (5), (6), (8), (9),
and the optimal federal tax rate T∗ (33), it can be seen that 1+ tT > 1 is
required to obtain that expression (41) to be bigger than one. Number of
households has been normalised to 1 for making easier the proof.
As can be seen, the key point to internalize vertical externalities is the
states’ reaction function. We need to have state governments that increase
their taxes when the federal government sets higher tax rates, and vice versa;
only this way the federal policy-makers acting as Stackelberg can correct
vertical externalities. One of the main implications is that the eﬀectiveness
of federal policy depends crucially on an empirical issue because the sign of
tT is theoretically ambiguous.
6C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
Sharing tax instruments between federal and subnational governments is a
common feature in federations. It allows that diﬀerent levels of government
to be involved in ﬁnancing their own public expenditures. However, the con-
currency of tax power on the same tax base causes that vertical tax external-
ities appear, and a deviation of the results from the second best allocation is
produced.
Also vertical externalities arise when public spending provided by one
level of government aﬀects other government’s decisions. This is the case,
for instance, of public inputs such as public investment, education and so on,
that may exert diﬀerent impacts on the tax revenues belonging to other gov-
ernments. This second vertical externality has received very little attention
in the literature on ﬁscal federalism, though it may be found in countries
such as United States, Australia and Spain, or in supranational structures as
can be seen with European regional policies.
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per unit taxes on labor to ﬁnance two types of public expenditures. Fed-
eral government provides a consumption public good, while state govern-
ments supply a productivity-enhancing public input. Second best allocation
i sr e a c h e di na nu n i t a r yc o u n t r y ,a n du s e da sb e n c h m a r k .W h e nN a s hb e h a v -
ior is to be assumed for governments, a vertical externality arises from the
provision of public inputs, as well as the tax externality. While the former
exerts an ambiguous eﬀect on the federal tax revenues, the latter presents a
clear negative inﬂuence. In this model, the sign and extent of the expendi-
ture externality depend on the tax externality, amongst other things. Here,
it has been proved that using production eﬃciency condition as criterion of
optimality in federal systems leads to incorrect conclusions. Moreover, our
results drive to distinguish between the cost of the public funds and the pro-
vision cost of the public input, which includes the former and the tax revenue
eﬀect.
Also the ability of federal government to achieve the second best outcome
has been studied. Our approach restricts the policy instruments of the fed-
eral government, and it means that vertical transfers are not available for
eﬃciency purposes. With the model described here, we cannot ensure that
the federal government behaving as Stackelberg leader may attain the second
best result. We only will have some guarantees about that when the states’
reaction function to be such that an increase in the federal tax rate is fol-
lowed by an increment in the state tax rate, and vice versa. Other result we
ﬁnd is that the optimum federal tax rate has not to be necessary negative in
order to correct both vertical externalities.
Further research can be initiated on the basis of this paper. One interest-
ing point would come from introducing households mobility in an environ-
ment with heterogeneous regions. It would aﬀect eﬃciency of the equilibria,
which would have to be restricted in order to avoid multiple solutions. More-
over, horizontal externalities would arise and the set of policy instruments
probably should be enlarged to consider transfers between governments; oth-
erwise, replicating the second best outcome may become impossible. A sec-
ond extension could study behaviors of governments when the public goods
and inputs they provide are substitutes or complementaries between them-
selves. Not only new vertical expenditures externalities would appear, but
also new possibilities for correcting externalities. Indeed, federal government
could use its own public spending with the aim of providing an optimal
amount of public inputs. Performance of this policy would be on the basis
that diﬀerent layers of government are able to provide the same o similar
public inputs. Thirdly, given the relevance of states’ reaction function on
the eﬀectiveness of federal policies, empirical researches could highlight how
the state governments modify their behaviors when facing federal decisions.
To the best of our knowledge, there is a stimulating lack of empirical pa-
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May 2005pers on this issue. Papers such as Besley and Rosen (1998), Esteller-More
and Sole-Olle (2001) or Anderson et al. (2004) could be enlarged to deal
explicitly with issues related to the interplays between expenditure and tax
externalities or the MCP. At this point, the empirical analyses should con-
sider not only the MCPF (in fact, a not very usual aspect regarded in this
kind of approaches), but also the tax revenue eﬀect arising when there exist
complementarities between public spending and tax revenues.
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